```
TRACY L. WILKISON
 1
    Acting United States Attorney
    CHRISTOPHER D. GRIGG
 2
    Assistant United States Attorney
    Chief, National Security Division
 3
    CAMERON L. SCHROEDER (Cal. Bar No. 255016)
 4
    Assistant United States Attorney
    Chief, Cyber & Intellectual Property Crimes Section
 5
         1500 United States Courthouse
         312 North Spring Street
 6
         Los Angeles, California 90012
         Telephone: (213) 894-0596
 7
         Facsimile: (213) 894-2927
         E-mail:
                    cameron.schroeder@usdoj.gov
 8
    ADAM ALEXANDER
    Assistant United States Attorney
 9
    U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Alaska
         222 W. 7th Avenue, Suite 253
10
         Anchorage, AK 99505
         Telephone: (907) 271-2309
11
         E-mail:
                    adam.alexander@usdoj.gov
12
    Attorneys for Plaintiff
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
13
                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
14
                   FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
15
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      No. CR 19-00036-JAK
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             Plaintiff,
                                      SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF AUTHORITY
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                                      Trial Date: August 26, 2021
                   v.
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                                      Trial Time: 8:30 AM
    MATTHEW GATREL,
                                      Location:
                                                  Courtroom of the Hon.
19
                                                  John A. Kronstadt
             Defendant.
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         Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel
22
    of record, the Acting United States Attorney for the Central
23
    District of California and Assistant United States Attorneys Cameron
24
    L. Schroeder and Adam Alexander, hereby submit to the court this
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    supplemental notice of authority regarding cumulative evidence and
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expert testimony.

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1	Dated: August 30, 2021	Respectfully submitted,
2		TRACY L. WILKISON Acting United States Attorney
3		CHRISTOPHER D. GRIGG
4		Assistant United States Attorney
5		Chief, National Security Division
6		/s/ CAMERON L. SCHROEDER
7		ADAM ALEXANDER
8		Assistant United States Attorneys
9		Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows the Court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.

This Court retains discretion to exclude cumulative expert testimony. United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 431 F.3d 643, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 547 U.S. 1113 (2006).

Rule "403's cumulative evidence provision does not prohibit the introduction of cumulative evidence; rather, it merely permits courts to exclude cumulative evidence when it has little incremental value." United States v. Miguel, 87 Fed. Appx. 67, 68 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2004) (Unpub. Disp.); see also United States v. Taylor, 127 F.3d 1108, 1997 WL 661153, *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 1997) (Unpub. Disp.) ("[E] ven cumulative evidence is not necessarily excludable under Rule 403—evidence must be needless[ly] cumulative before its admission by the district court amounts to an abuse of discretion," citing United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1990)). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, a district court can exclude evidence that is "needlessly cumulative and a waste of time." United States v. Shayota, 784 F. App'x 986, 990 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).

The trial court's decision under Rule 403 is discretionary.

<u>United States v. Mirabelles</u>, 724 F.2d 1374, 1382 (9th Cir.1984).

The Ninth Circuit has also said Rule 403 is "an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly ... [u]nder terms of the rule, the danger of

prejudice must not merely outweigh the probative value of the evidence, but substantially outweigh it." <u>United States v. Mende</u>, 43 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir.1995).

Additionally, "the mere presence of overlap, reference to another expert's report or a similar conclusion ... does not render an expert report unnecessarily 'cumulative' pursuant to FRE 403."

Montgomery v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 12CV3057-AJB (DHB), 2015 WL 11233382, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015) (citing Banks v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 41, 51 (Fed. Cl. May 4, 2010)). The Court has discretion in determining when cumulative evidence becomes "needlessly" cumulative and should therefore be excludable. United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1990). As such, "even cumulative evidence is not necessarily excludable under Rule 403—evidence must be 'needless[ly] cumulative' before its admission by the district court amounts to an abuse of discretion." United States v. Taylor, No. 96-30343, 1997 WL 661153 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Skillman, 922 F.2d at 1374).

While an expert witness may not testify to a legal conclusion, he may testify to an ultimate issue of fact. See, e.g., Elsayed

Mukhtar v. California State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 n.

10 (9th Cir. 2002) ("It is well-established, however, that expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue is not per se improper.

Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) provides that expert testimony that is 'otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.' However, an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law.") (citing

Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original) (amended sub nom. Mukhtar v. California State Univ., Hayward, 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds in Est. of Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 2014), which was then overruled by United States v. Bacon, 979 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2020)). See also Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) ("An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue"); see also id., 1972 Advisory Committee Notes ("The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them when helpful to the trier of fact. In order to render this approach fully effective and to allay any doubt on the subject, the so-called 'ultimate issue' rule is specifically abolished by the instant rule"). 302 F.R.D. 537, 557-58.